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Are Energy Efficiency Standards Justified? 
Ian W.H. Parry, David Evans, and Wallace E. Oates 
Abstract 
This paper develops and parameterizes an overarching analytical framework to estimate the 
welfare effects of energy efficiency standards applied to automobiles and electricity-using durables. We 
also compare standards with sectoral and economywide pricing policies. The model captures a wide range 
of externalities and preexisting energy policies, and it allows for possible “misperceptions”—market 
failures that cause underinvestment in energy efficiency. 
Automobile fuel economy standards are not part of the first-best policy to reduce gasoline: fuel 
taxes are always superior because they reduce the externalities related to vehicle miles traveled. For the 
power sector, potential welfare gains from supplementing pricing instruments with efficiency standards 
are small at best. If pricing instruments are not feasible, a large misperceptions failure is required to 
justify efficiency standards, and even in this case the optimal reductions in fuel and electricity use are 
relatively modest. Reducing economywide carbon dioxide emissions through regulatory packages 
(combining efficiency and emissions standards) involves much higher costs than pricing instruments. 
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Are Energy Efficiency Standards Justified? 
Ian W.H. Parry, David Evans, and Wallace E. Oates∗ 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the political pendulum has swung back toward a far more interventionist 
role for government in U.S. energy markets. A major manifestation of this movement has been 
the proliferation of actual and proposed energy efficiency standards. Most prominent are the 
recent rulings on new light-duty vehicles requiring manufacturers to increase theirs fleets’ 
average fuel economy from 25 miles per gallon to about 35 mpg by 2016. In addition, household 
appliances are subject to numerous standards, incandescent light bulbs are being phased out, and 
federal energy efficiency standards are proposed for residential and commercial buildings.  
What kinds of market failure could justify energy efficiency standards? An obvious 
possibility is pollution externalities, especially emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Generally 
speaking, however, efficiency standards are an inferior instrument to energy or emissions taxes. 
Unlike the pricing approach, efficiency standards do not reduce the intensity of use of energy 
durables; in fact, they tend to increase their use through the “rebound effect” (Khazzoom 1980). 
Nor do they reduce pollution emissions per unit of energy or produce least-cost outcomes 
through equating marginal abatement costs across different sectors.  
A second class of potential market failures is associated with the so-called energy 
paradox, the observed reluctance of energy users to adopt apparently cost-effective, efficient 
technologies (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Gillingham et al. 2009; Tietenberg 2009), even energy-
saving technologies with implicit rates of return in excess of 25 percent (Allcott and Wozny 
2009, Hausman 1979, Sanstad et al. 2006, Train 1985). Some analysts cite this as evidence that 
consumers misperceive energy efficiency benefits perhaps because of “missing” information. 
Others point out that there might be “hidden costs” not accounted for in these studies, such as 
product attributes (e.g., people may object to the quality of fluorescent lighting), various search 
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costs, high borrowing costs, and aversion toward “irreversible investments” with uncertain 
returns (Hassett and Metcalf 1993).1 At the same time, certain information programs (like the 
voluntary EPA Green Lights program and various EnergyStar programs) appear to have 
increased energy-efficiency investments (e.g., Howarth et al. 2000).  
The general issue is important because the source of the failures has direct policy 
implications. For externalities, the preferred approach is pricing measures, but for 
misperceptions, information programs can play an important role. In either case, efficiency 
standards appear to be a second-best measure whose justification presumably depends on 
practical constraints on the economically preferred policy. 
The actual and prospective adoption of energy efficiency standards raises a number of 
interrelated policy issues. First, what are their overall welfare effects and how do they compare 
with welfare effects from other policy options? Second, what combinations of market failures, 
particularly related to CO2 damages and the extent of misperceptions market failures, justify 
efficiency standards of given stringencies? And third, to what extent can efficiency standards, 
when combined with other regulatory approaches, achieve the cost-effectiveness of CO2 pricing 
instruments, should the latter prove difficult to implement in practice?  
Our paper provides an analytical framework for understanding these questions and for 
gaining some sense of the empirical magnitude of welfare effects, for policies affecting energy 
efficiency in the transport and power sectors. From the model we derive a series of empirically 
useful formulas that show how the welfare effects of regulatory and pricing policies depend on 
interactions with externalities, informational market failures, and preexisting energy policies. 
Although a richer framework than ours might incorporate capital dynamics, greater product 
disaggregation, and producer heterogeneity, a good deal may still be learned from the 
parsimonious model developed here, which captures the most important features for our 
purposes.  
In general, prior literature provides insight on some components of our welfare analysis 
but does not construct the overarching framework needed for the policy questions posed here. 
For example, previous studies have been largely sector specific and therefore do not compare the 
welfare effects of standards versus economywide pricing, nor do they compare and contrast 
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standards across the transport and power sectors, or explore to what extent regulatory packages 
can mimic emissions pricing. There has also been little attempt to simultaneously integrate 
externalities and informational market failures. And the conditions required to justify standards 
of different stringencies, with and without constraints on emissions pricing policies, have not 
been explicitly modeled.2  
One study that also, like ours, provides an overarching framework is Krupnick et al. 
(2010), who estimate the cost-effectiveness of a wide range of policies, including efficiency 
standards, to reduce CO2 and oil use. Their analysis is based on simulating a variant of the 
Department of Energy’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) out to 2030; ours is a much 
simpler, static analytical framework. Nonetheless, there is useful complementarity between the 
two studies, and some of our results on policy costs (gross of externalities) are broadly consistent 
with those from the far more sophisticated variation of NEMS.  
We summarize some of our findings as follows.  
First, efficiency standards are not part of the optimal policy (or policy combination) to 
address market failures for automobiles, even under our upper-bound case for misperceptions 
market failures. Fuel taxes have a much lower net cost because of (unpriced) externality benefits 
associated with reduced vehicle use (reduced traffic congestion and so on). The welfare gains 
forgone under efficiency standards from failing to exploit this response outweigh any potential 
advantage at targeting misperceptions failures more directly. Even if fuel taxes are fixed, 
efficiency standards are warranted only under stringent conditions. For example, using standards 
to cut fuel use by 5 percent under a standard value for CO2 damages is warranted only if 
consumers fail to internalize 44 percent of the savings from higher fuel economy. In fact, recent 
rulings that rapidly ramp up the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards are not 
supported on welfare grounds, even under our bounding cases for market failures. 
Second, in the power sector, where there are no large ancillary externalities related to 
product use, even under our upper-bound case for misperceptions market failures, supplementing 
electricity taxation with an efficiency standard can increase welfare by only a relatively small 
amount. And if taxes are infeasible, the market failures needed to justify reducing economywide 
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electricity use under standards alone soon become implausibly large beyond reductions of a few 
percentage points. 
Third, regulatory approaches, even when used in least-cost combinations, are poor 
substitutes for pricing approaches. When large misperceptions failures justify a role for 
efficiency standards, and when these standards are used in combination with CO2 emissions 
standards for the power sector, the costs of this regulatory combination are around $15 billion 
more per year than for an emissions pricing policy (given the goals for reducing energy-related 
CO2 emissions envisioned in recent climate bills). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the analytical 
model and derives key formulas. Section 3 discusses the baseline data. Section 4 presents the 
main quantitative findings. Section 5 summarizes and discusses model limitations.  
2. Analytical Framework  
We develop a static, general equilibrium model with CO2 emissions produced from 
vehicle fuel combustion, power generation, and other sectors. The model captures the possibility 
of suboptimal investment in energy efficiency for vehicles and electricity durables; broader 
externalities (which are especially important for automobiles); energy efficiency regulations that 
apply comprehensively to automobiles and partially to electricity durables (representing a 
combination of appliance standards, building codes, etc.); possible taxes on energy and CO2; and 
possible regulations on the power generation mix. Our analysis implicitly assumes that any 
regulations—efficiency or emissions standards—are “smart” in terms of providing credit-trading 
provisions that equate marginal compliance costs across different firms.  
A. Model Structure 
(i) Household utility 
At the start of the period, households purchase three durable goods for use over the 
period, indexed by i: an automobile (A); an electricity-intensive durable good (R) representing an 
aggregation of final and intermediate products that are, or could potentially be, subject to binding 
energy efficiency regulations (e.g., appliances, buildings, lighting); and an electricity-intensive 
durable good (N) representing an aggregation of all electricity-using goods that might be difficult Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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to regulate. Although R is an aggregate of many heterogeneous products, we indicate below how 
results would change if efficiency regulations were applied to narrower product categories.3  
The representative agent’s utility function is 
(1a) ) , , , , , , , ( E A N R A Z Z C Y I v v v u u =  
(1b) )) ( , , ( i i i i i i e m S v v μ =  
In (1b), vi(.) is subutility from use of durable good i, Si is purchases (at the start of the 
period), or the stock, of durable good i, and mi is the intensity with which this good is used—
miles driven per auto or hours of operation for electricity-using goods over the period.4 ei is 
energy consumption per unit of use of durable good i—that is, fuel use per mile of driving or 
electricity use per unit of time; the inverse of ei is thus energy efficiency. The role of ei in the 
utility function is to allow for possible hidden costs from reductions in energy intensity. For 
example, fuel-saving technologies have hidden costs if they imply reduced vehicle power, and 
fluorescent bulbs may have hidden costs if households prefer the brighter, instantaneous lighting 
from incandescent bulbs. Thus, μi represents a broad index of attributes from product i, where 
μi(.) is weakly concave with  0 ≤ ′ i μ . The ei may be determined by household choices (implicitly 
through their choice of models with and without advanced energy-saving technologies); 
alternatively, eA and eR may be set by the government, if energy intensity standards are binding.5  
In (1a), C is carbon dioxide emissions; ZA is an index of externalities related to 
automobile use, including local pollution, congestion, and accidents; ZE is local pollution from 
electricity generation. Here we have omitted externalities from oil dependence because they are 
difficult to define, let alone quantify—including them would be equivalent to attaching a higher 
value to CO2 reductions from the transport sector (see below). Finally, I is an aggregate of 
industrial consumer products, and Y is an aggregate of nonindustrial consumer goods and 
services that do not use electricity. The former sector captures CO2 emissions outside the power 
and (light-duty) transport sectors, and the latter represents “clean” consumption. 
                                                 
3 Explicitly distinguishing the use of electricity durables at the industrial, commercial, and residential level would 
not affect our results. 
4 mi and Si enter vi separately, rather than as a product, to avoid the corner solution where only one good of type i is 
purchased in the entire economy. 
5 Historically, standards for autos have been defined in terms of fuel economy rather than fuel intensity. However, 
they are now integrated with CO2 (and hence energy) standards per mile. Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
  6
All variables are economywide aggregates, expressed in per capita terms (variables are 
therefore continuous even though the quantity of durables is discrete at the individual level). A 
bar denotes a variable perceived as exogenous by individuals. u(.), overall utility, is increasing 
and quasi-concave in its first five arguments and declining in the last three; vi(.) is increasing and 
quasi-concave in its arguments. 
(ii) Perceived energy costs 
The (actual) lifetime energy cost for durable good i, denoted Li, is 
(2) i i E E i e m t q L ) ( + = ,i = R, N,  A A G G A e m t q L ) ( + =  
where discounting over the lifecycle is implicit. qE and qG are the producer prices of electricity 
and gasoline, respectively, and tE and tG are specific taxes on these goods (residential electricity 
use is currently taxed at the state level but gasoline is taxed at both federal and state levels). 
Lifetime costs equal product use, times energy consumption per unit of use, times the tax-
inclusive consumer price.  
The lifetime cost, as perceived by agents when the good is purchased, is (1−ρi)Li, where 
1 0 ≤ ≤ i ρ  reflects the extent to which agents misperceive, or otherwise fail to internalize, future 
energy costs relative to actual costs. Such undervaluation could result from misperceptions over 
future energy efficiency, limitations on their cognitive ability to absorb and process information 
on energy efficiency, or systematic errors in forecasting energy prices or use of energy durables. 
Implicitly, government programs, such as required fuel economy stickers on salesroom cars or 
certified labeling of appliance efficiency through EnergyStar, imply a lower value of ρi.  
(iii) Externalities  
Externalities are defined by 






C + + = , A A A A S m z Z = ,  E z Z E E =  
(3b) A A A S m e G = , i i i i S m e E = ,  G i ≠ , N R E E E + =  
G is gasoline consumption (the fuel consumption rate times miles per vehicle times the 
vehicle stock). Similarly, Ei is electricity use from product i, and E is total electricity use.  
In (3a), 
G
C z , 
E
C z  and 
I
C z  denote the CO2 intensity of gasoline, electricity, and industrial 
production, respectively. 
G
C z  and 
I
C z  are given, but 
E
C z  is chosen by firms, implicitly through 
their chosen mix of power generation fuels. zA is an index of congestion, accident, and local 
pollution externalities per mile of automobile travel; local emissions vary with mileage rather 
than fuel use, given that all vehicles must satisfy the same emissions per mile standards Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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regardless of their fuel economy, which decouples emissions from fuel economy (Parry and 
Small 2005). zE is an index of local emissions, which vary in proportion to power generation 
(this potentially includes NOX, mercury, and SO2, depending on how these emissions are 
regulated).  
(iv) Production 
All firms are competitive and produce under constant returns; thus, producer prices equal 
unit production costs. For our purposes, this assumption seems reasonable for automobiles.6 For 
the power sector, the issue is more complex, and we return to it at the end of the paper.   
Product and energy prices are determined by  
(4a) ) ( i i i e k p = , I I p p = , Y Y p p =  
(4b)
G





C E E z t z k q + = ) (  
(4d) C
E
C E t z k = ′ ) (  
where  C t  is a uniform, economywide “price” on CO2 emissions, assumed not to exceed its 
Pigouvian level. For now, this represents an emissions tax, but later we also consider cap-and-
trade systems. 
In (4a), pi is the consumer price and ki(.) the unit production cost for durable good i, 
respectively. ki(.) is increasing with respect to reductions in ei, reflecting the incorporation of 
(costly) energy-saving technologies into the product.  I p  and  Y p  denote the (fixed) unit 
production costs of the industrial good and the clean good, respectively. In (4b), the producer 
price of gasoline equals the (fixed) unit production cost  G q  plus the pass-through of the CO2 
price. In (4c), kE (.) is the unit production cost for power generation, which is increasing and 
convex with respect to reductions in 
E
C z , reflecting costs of substituting coal with cleaner fuels 
(or possibly, down the road, installation of carbon capture and storage technologies). The 
producer price of electricity equals this cost plus the pass-through of the CO2 price. In (4d), we 
assume that power companies abate CO2 emissions from fuel switching until the incremental 
cost equals the (avoided) tax payment.  
                                                 
6 Although in practice there are significant differences between the price of new autos and their unit production cost, 
this appears to make little quantitative difference to the overall efficiency costs of fuel economy regulations and fuel 
taxes, given their modest effect on new vehicle demand (e.g., Austin and Dinan 2005).   Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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Firms play a passive role, meeting household demand for products, fuel, electricity, and 
energy efficiency (if it is not fixed by regulation).  
(v) Government 
The government sets maximum energy efficiency standards for automobiles,  A e , and 
regulated electricity durables,  R e . We also consider a policy combination involving these 
standards and an emissions standard imposed on the power sector, 
E
C z . 
The government budget constraint, equating spending and revenue from gasoline, 
electricity, and emissions pricing, is  
(5) C t E t G t GOV C E G + + =  
where GOV is a lump-sum government transfer to households to capture the recycling of revenue 
to the economy.  
(vi) Household optimization 
Households optimize in two steps. First, they make upfront choices over product 
purchases and energy efficiency, based on perceived lifecycle costs and planned use of durables 
and consumption goods, subject to a perceived, fixed-income budget constraint. Second, during 
the course of the period, they may reoptimize over product usage if energy costs differ from 
initial perceptions.7 As shown in Appendix A, this optimization implies that the private benefit 
from one additional durable good equals its price plus perceived lifetime energy cost; the private 
benefit from incremental usage of the durable good equals its (tax-inclusive) energy cost; and 
energy intensity is reduced until the resulting increase in cost of the durable equals the marginal 
saving in perceived lifetime energy costs less the value of any reduction in other product 
attributes.  
All demands are taken to be constant elasticity functions of the relevant own-price—
product prices plus perceived lifetime energy costs for durables, and energy prices for product 
usage and energy intensity (see Appendix A). In addition, we make the (reasonable) 
approximation that the demand for travel, industrial goods, and regulated and unregulated 
electricity durables are independent; this rules out, for example, the possibility that reduced 
emissions from sector-specific policies in the transport sector are partly offset by extra emissions 
                                                 
7 This is reasonable because vehicle or appliance usage is an ongoing decision, unlike the one-off consumer durable 
purchase decision, which requires forecasting energy use and prices over a long period of time. Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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in the industrial and power sectors.8 From the demand functions we can decompose the 














i E η = , i ≠ A 
A m
G η , 
A S
G η and 
A e
G η  are the elasticity of miles per vehicle, vehicle demand, and gasoline 
intensity with respect to gasoline prices, and the sum of these elasticities,  G η , is the overall 
gasoline price elasticity. 
i m
E η  , 
i S
E η  and 
i e
E η  are the elasticity of usage of electricity durable i, the 
demand for that good, and its electricity intensity, with respect to electricity prices, and 
i E η  is the 
elasticity of electricity consumption for good i with respect to the electricity price. (All 
elasticities are negative.) 
B. Welfare Formulas  
We now discuss formulas (derived in Appendix A) for the marginal welfare effects of 
policy-induced reductions in gasoline, electricity, and CO2 emissions. We focus on marginal 
costs (denoted MC), defined net of welfare benefits from correcting market failures—thus, 
policies improve welfare up to the point where MC is zero. Marginal costs are obtained by totally 
differentiating the household’s indirect utility function with respect to a policy variable, 
accounting for changes in pollution, other externalities, and (balanced budget) government 
transfers, and dividing by the induced change in gasoline, electricity, or CO2. We also briefly 
discuss how results change when CO2 is fixed by a cap, when efficiency standards should 
complement pricing instruments, the relation between information dissemination programs and 
efficiency standards, and the welfare potential of policies combining efficiency standards with 
emissions rate standards. 
(i) Reducing gasoline use  
Gasoline tax. The marginal cost of a tax-induced reduction in gasoline (
G t
G MC ), 
expressed per gallon, can be decomposed as follows: 
(7a) − − − =
A
C C C G
t



























⋅ + ⋅ − ) (   
                                                 
8 For example, in Small (2009) the effects of transportation policies on the power sector are negligible. Down the 
road, the power and transportation sectors could become more integrated if there is substantial penetration of plug-in 
electric vehicles and greater competition between the two sectors for biomass-based fuels. For the most part, 
electricity durables that are unregulated (e.g., TV sets) are not close substitutes for regulated electricity durables 
(e.g., refrigerators, buildings). Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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where 
(7b) G G G G q G t q t
G − Δ − + =







= Δ  
(7c) λ /
C Z C u EXT − = , λ /
A Z A A u z EXT ⋅ − =  
(7d) 0 =
A e
G η  if  A e  is binding 
G ˆ Δ  denotes the proportionate reduction in gasoline (and similarly for other variables 
with ^ below), and superscript 0 denotes an initial value prior to policy change. λ is the marginal 
utility of income. 
As indicated in (7c),  C EXT  is the (monetized) disutility, or external cost, per additional 
unit of CO2 emissions, and  A EXT  is the external cost from congestion, accidents, and local 
pollution, per extra auto mile. We assume  C EXT  and  A EXT  are constant (which is reasonable 
over the range of fuel reductions considered below). 
The first component of the marginal cost in (7a) is the prevailing fuel tax or wedge 
between forgone consumer benefits and savings in supply costs per gallon reduction in gasoline. 
In (7b) the tax rate rises with respect to the proportionate reduction in gasoline. Thus, this first 
component determines the slope of the marginal cost as well as contributing 
0
G t  to its intercept, 
given preexisting gasoline taxes. All other components in (7a) serve to shift down the marginal 
cost curve and reduce its intercept.  
The second component nets out the marginal external benefit from reducing CO2 
emissions per gallon, less any amount of this externality internalized through a CO2 tax.  
The third component nets out the marginal external benefit from reduced auto mileage. It 
equals  A EXT , divided by eA to express externalities in costs per gallon, where eA falls with higher 
taxes as manufacturers incorporate fuel-saving technologies into vehicles. This component is 
multiplied by the fraction of the gasoline demand elasticity that is due to reduced overall mileage 
(through reduced intensity of vehicle use and reduced demand for vehicles) as opposed to 
improved fuel economy. The smaller the fraction of the marginal reduction in gasoline use that 
comes from reduced driving, the smaller the mileage-related externality benefits per gallon 
reduction in fuel use (Parry and Small 2005).  
The final component nets out the potential welfare gain from offsetting misperceptions 
market failures. It equals the noninternalized fraction of fuel economy benefits, times the 
consumer value per gallon of gasoline savings, times the fraction of the gasoline reduction that 
comes from improved fuel economy, and also reduced vehicle purchases (recall that vehicle Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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demand is excessive when  1 < A ρ ). Thus, different assumptions about the share of the 
incremental gasoline reduction that comes from improved fuel economy, as opposed to reduced 
mileage per vehicle, will alter the relative magnitude of the last two cost components in (7a), but 
in opposite directions. 
Finally, from (7d), preexisting and binding fuel economy standards alter the tax-induced 
welfare cost indirectly by eliminating the reduction in fuel intensity. This (greatly) reduces the 
magnitude of the last welfare component. However, it also implies that mileage now falls in 
proportion to gasoline use, which (greatly) increases mileage-related externality benefits per 
gallon reduction in gasoline. As discussed in Small (2009), 
A e
G η  may still be nonzero, even with 
binding fuel economy standards (e.g., households with two vehicles may drive the more efficient 
one more intensively in response to higher fuel prices); hence our analysis with and without 
binding standards provides bounding cases.  
Energy efficiency standard. The marginal cost from tightening a (binding) fuel per mile 
standard (
A e
G MC ) is (Appendix A)
 
 
(8a) + − − =
A
C C C G
e
G z t EXT MC












G G A r
t q
−
⋅ + ⋅ −
1
1
) ( ρ   
(8b) G
r
G G G q G t q
A
A e
G − Δ − + =
− ) 1 (
1
) ˆ 1 )( (














G η − ≅  
rA denotes the rebound effect. As defined in (8c), this is the fraction of the initial fuel 
savings from an incremental reduction in fuel intensity ( A AS m ) that is offset by the increase in 
mileage in response to lower fuel costs per mile ( A A A A e d S m d e / ) ( ⋅ − ). Here (following Small 
and Van Dender 2006), we approximate by assuming that changes in fuel economy do not affect 
vehicle demand. The rebound effect is therefore equivalent to 
A m
G η −  because proportionate 
reductions in fuel consumption and fuel prices have an equivalent effect on per mile fuel costs 
and vehicle use.  
G δ  is the shadow price on gasoline. As shown in Appendix A, it corresponds to the gap 
between the increase in vehicle costs and possible loss of vehicle attributes, net of the actual 
savings in lifetime fuel costs, expressed per gallon of fuel savings. Its initial value (when  0 ˆ = G ) 
is the preexisting fuel tax (which distorts equally all margins of behavior affecting fuel 
consumption). However, this shadow cost rises more rapidly with respect to G ˆ  than the gasoline 
tax does in (7b) because the policy places almost the entire burden of fuel savings on improved Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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efficiency and does not exploit savings from reduced mileage per vehicle. In other words 
A e
G MC  
is more steeply sloped than 
G t
G MC . In fact, because of the rebound effect, an even larger 
improvement in fuel economy is required to achieve a given G ˆ  (i.e., the rebound effect increases 
the rate at which  G δ  rises).  
The second component in (8a), reflecting net CO2 benefits per gallon, is the same as in 
(7a). However, the third component in (8a) is a positive (rather than negative) cost because 
mileage-related externalities increase with the rebound effect; thus, this component shifts up the 
marginal cost curve. On the other hand, to the extent that lifecycle costs are not internalized, the 
last component is a larger gain than under the tax. This is because all, rather than a fraction, of 
the gasoline reduction comes from improved fuel economy (or reduced vehicle demand). These 
gains are magnified (moderately) to the extent that the fuel economy increase must be higher, 
because of the rebound effect, to achieve a given reduction in fuel use.  
(ii) Reducing electricity use 
The marginal cost of reducing electricity through higher electricity taxes, expressed per 
kWh, is given by 
(9a) − − − =
E
C C C E
t
E z t EXT t MC














⋅ + ⋅ − ∑
= ,
) (   
where 
(9b) E E E E q E t q t
E − Δ − + =
η / 1 0 ) ˆ 1 )( (  
(9c) λ /
E Z E E u z EXT ⋅ − =  
(9d) 0
R e
E η =  if  R e  is binding 
E EXT  is the external cost from non-CO2 pollution, per extra kWh (assumed constant). 
The components of (9a) are essentially analogous to those for the gasoline tax in (7a), 
with two exceptions. One is that that non-CO2 externalities are proportional to all changes in 
electricity consumption (rather than just those from changes in product use). The other is that 
noninternalized lifecycle costs are weighted averages across the two electricity durables.  
The marginal cost of the efficiency standard (
R e
E MC ) is similar to that for the auto 
efficiency standard in (8a and b) (see Appendix A for the formula). The big difference is that 
there is no exacerbation of non-CO2 externalities from the rebound effect. The final welfare 
component for the efficiency standard is analogous to that in (8a), with parameters applying only 
to the regulated durable.  Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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(iii) Deriving iso-market failures curves required to justify efficiency standards 
For any given level of (prevailing or prospective) energy or emissions taxation, an 
efficiency standard that further reduces gasoline by amount G ˆ , or electricity by E ˆ , is fully 
efficient if the marginal cost curves, 
G e
G MC  and 
R e
E MC , have negative intercepts and are exactly 
zero when evaluated at these reductions. From these conditions, it is straightforward to obtain 
“iso-market failure” curves that indicate combinations of CO2 (or energy security) externalities 
and misperceptions failures that are required to justify efficiency standards of given stringencies. 
(iv) Reducing (nationwide) CO2 emissions 
The marginal costs of energy taxes and efficiency standards are easily expressed in costs 
per ton of (economywide) CO2 reduced, by dividing the above expressions by CO2 per gallon or 
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The marginal cost per ton of reduced CO2 under the emissions tax, denoted 
C t
C MC , can be 
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Equation (11b) shows our assumed functional relation between economywide CO2 
emissions and the CO2 tax, where β and  C η  are parameters. 
In (11a) 
G α , 
E α , 
E z α , and 
I α  are the share of the marginal, tax-induced reduction in 
nationwide CO2 emissions from reduced gasoline use, reduced electricity consumption, 
reductions in CO2 per unit of electricity, and reductions from the industrial sector, respectively 
(see Appendix A for definitions of these terms). The marginal cost of the CO2 tax is the envelope 
of the marginal costs of reducing emissions through these four behavioral responses. For 
industrial reductions, the marginal cost is simply the CO2 tax rate, since there are no broader 
market failures for this margin of behavior, but for reductions from reduced emissions intensity 
in the power sector, local pollution effects are netted out from the CO2 tax. 
(v) The distinction between cap-and-trade and emissions taxes 
We show, in Appendix A, that the marginal cost formulas 
G t
G MC , 
G e
G MC , 
E t
E MC , and 
R e
E MC  change in one regard when CO2 emissions are fixed by a binding cap-and-trade system 




C MC . In this case, each unit reduction in CO2 due to the new policy is offset by a 
unit increase in emissions in the economy as a whole (via a reduction in the CO2 allowance 
price), resulting in a cost savings of 
C t
C MC . Thus, if the emissions price imposed by climate 
policy is greater than 50 percent of the external cost of CO2 emissions, there is a greater gain 
from reducing emissions through other policies when the carbon instrument is cap-and-trade 
rather than an emissions tax.  
(vi) Potential value of energy information programs 
As shown in Appendix A, the marginal cost of information programs, per unit reduction 
in gasoline, electricity, or CO2 emissions, is analogous to the marginal cost of the relevant energy 
efficiency standards (hence we do not illustrate separate results for information programs). 
Information programs increase energy efficiency, just like standards, though this is achieved 
indirectly through raising the perceived private benefits from higher efficiency. The effects of 
these programs may be limited if ρ is already close to zero. However, information programs 
avoid the risk of excessively increasing energy efficiency, in the sense of pushing the 
incremental costs of energy efficiency improvements beyond the point at which they are justified 
by discounted energy savings.  
(vii) Regulatory alternatives to CO2 pricing 
Although not a central focus of our paper, a CO2/kWh emissions standard can be a 
relatively low cost approach for exploiting the large potential for CO2 emissions reductions in the 
power sector. Our interest here lies in the extent to which combining this policy with efficiency 
standards can mimic the effects of a CO2 pricing policy, which is especially timely given the 
practical obstacles to pricing policies. 
As shown in Appendix A, the marginal cost of the emissions standard is approximately 
equivalent to the CO2 tax that would produce the same overall emissions reduction as the 
emissions standard, divided by the share of reductions under this CO2 tax that would come from 
reduced emissions intensity in the power sector. The emissions standard does also reduce 
electricity demand because abatement costs are passed forward into electricity prices. However, 
this effect is relatively small, given that the emissions standard does not create the equivalent of 
carbon tax payments, or allowances rents, that are reflected in higher electricity prices under 
market-based policies.  
All of the above formulas were simulated in a spreadsheet, using functional form 
assumptions noted above and parameter values described below. In addition, we also mention Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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some results for policy combinations that were obtained iteratively in the spreadsheet (rather 
than from explicit analytical formulas). 
3. Parameter Values  
Here we comment briefly on data assumptions for our simulations, as summarized in 
Table 1, which is representative of year 2008 or thereabouts. Parameters for the transportation 
sector are taken from prior literature; for the power sector we construct estimates by aggregating 
products within regulated and unregulated sectors.  
A. Basic Transportation Data 
We assume the average fuel economy of the (on-road) light-duty vehicle fleet is 23 miles 
per gallon, or alternatively, fuel intensity is 43.5 gallons per 1,000 miles (BTS 2009, Table 4.23). 
From Parry and Small (2005), we take the combined federal and (average) state gasoline tax to 
be $0.40/gallon And, based on the average price between 2003 and 2008, we assume a pretax 
gasoline price of $2.15/gallon.9 Initial fuel use is taken to be 130 billion gallons (BTS 2009, 
Table 4.5).  
Based on the widely cited study by Small and Van Dender (2006), we assume that the 
(long-run) own-price elasticity of gasoline is –0.4, with half of the response due to changes in 
fuel economy and half due to changes in vehicle miles. Thus, the gasoline demand elasticity is –
0.2 in the presence of fully binding fuel economy standards. We further assume that the mileage 
response is split equally between changes in the vehicle stock and miles per vehicle. This implies 
a rebound effect of 10 percent (for a given vehicle stock), which is approximately consistent with 
Small and Van Dender (2006).  
B. Basic Electricity Data  
Electricity consumption in the residential, industrial, and commercial sectors was 4,176 
billion kWh in 2007, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009). Based on 
classifying products, and aggregating over each product’s electricity use, in EIA surveys, we 
assume that 60 percent of this consumption is from durables that are, or are potentially, subject to 
efficiency standards. The main groups in the regulated category include most major appliances, 
lighting, buildings, and heating and cooling equipment, while the unregulated category includes 
                                                 
9 See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mg_tco_usA.htm. Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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smaller appliances, audio and entertainment equipment, industrial processes such as assembly 
lines. We suspect that a large share of industrial electricity consumption is unlikely to be subject 
to efficiency standards given the heterogeneity of the electricity-consuming capital stock across 
industries and facilities. Furthermore, in the analysis below, we make the favorable assumption 
that the set of efficiency standards reduce consumption at least cost. That is, the marginal cost 
per kWh of consumption reduced of each individual product standard is the same. Energy 
intensity for the two electricity sectors is simply usage divided by 8760 hours per year.  
The average (pretax) electricity price over all end users was 8.2 cents/kWh in 2007, and 
state taxes averaged 0.9 cents/kWh (EIA 2010).  
We assume that the own-price elasticity of demand for electricity is –0.4 for both 
regulated and unregulated sectors, based on a long-run estimate by Myers et al. (2009), which is 
broadly consistent with other evidence (Sanstad and McMahon 2008). We further assume that 
the use per product, product demand, and electricity intensity elasticities are –0.13, –0.07, and –
0.2, respectively, for both sectors.10 
C. Externalities 
As regards CO2 emissions intensities, a gallon of gasoline combustion produces 0.009 ton 
of CO2, and given the prevailing fuel mix, the average emissions intensity of power generation is 
0.0005 ton of CO2 per kWh (EIA 2009).11 We consider a benchmark value of $20/ton for CO2 
damages and a range of up to $100/ton for sensitivity analysis (see Appendix B for the 
justification). The benchmark value implies CO2 damages of 18 cents/gallon and 1 cent/kWh. 
As regards oil dependence, Brown and Huntington (2009) put the external costs due to 
macroeconomic disruptions from world oil price volatility at equivalent to about 10 cents per 
gallon. Perhaps more important, dependence on an oil market influenced by hostile regimes 
might constrain U.S. foreign policy or threaten national security, though these geopolitical costs 
are not easily quantified. Therefore, we simply infer the implicit costs per gallon that would be 
required to justify automobile efficiency standards of different stringencies.  
                                                 
10 The first figure is Myers et al. (2009)’s electricity demand elasticity over the very short run, when there is very 
limited scope for altering product demand or energy efficiency. 
11 The latter reflects an average rate over different fuels. In practice, natural gas is often the marginal fuel, but its 
emissions intensity of 0.00045 tons/kWh for state-of-the-art plants is close to the average (EIA 2009). Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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From Small and Verhoef (2007), we assume local pollution damages of $0.01/auto-mile. 
For marginal congestion costs, we update Parry and Small (2005)’s figure by 30 percent to 
$0.045/mile.12 For marginal accident externalities, we increase Parry and Small (2005)’s estimate 
to $0.035/mile, based on the value of a statistical life now assumed by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, $5.8 million. Thus other externalities amount to $0.09/mile for autos.  
For electricity generation there are no externalities analogous to the energy security and 
product usage externalities applicable to autos.13 And local pollution benefits are modest, 0.13 
cents/kWh, because the bulk of high-damage emissions are capped under the sulfur trading 
program (see Appendix B).  
D. Misperceptions 
Appendix B describes empirical literature on implicit discount rates and possible reasons 
why they exceed market rates. We consider two bounding cases, one in which there is no 
misperceptions market failure (ρi = 0); that is, any differences between implicit and social 
discount rates are entirely explained by hidden costs. In the other, the entire difference is due to 
misperceptions over energy efficiency benefits. For electricity durables, we assume ρi (i = R, N) 
= 0.62 for this case, based on typical estimates of implicit discount rates; for automobiles, we 
adopt a bounding case of ρA = 0.65, based on a common assumption that consumers consider fuel 
savings from higher efficiency over only the first three years of a vehicle’s life (see Appendix 
B).  
E. Other Parameters 
We choose the αs in equation (11) to imply that for a 10 percent reduction in energy-
related, economywide CO2 emissions under a CO2 tax, 60 percent of these reductions would 
come from reduced emissions intensity in the power sector, 20 percent from reduced electricity 
demand, and 10 percent each from automobiles and from industrial and other sources. These 
assumptions are approximately consistent with U.S. EPA (2010), EIA (2008), and the relative 
responsiveness in the power and transport sectors implied by our own assumptions. Note that 
CO2 emissions from the power sector (which initially account for 40 percent of nationwide 
                                                 
12 This accounts for recent growth in the value of travel time and congestion (based on data in CEA 2009, Table B 
47, and Schrank and Lomax 2009, Table 4). 
13 Power generation fuels are domestically supplied. And although there is sporadic congestion on the grid, the 
damage risk, averaged across annual, nationwide generation, is likely very small. Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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emissions) are approximately twice as large as those for autos (Table 1). Finally, based 
approximately on U.S. EPA (2010) and EIA (2008) we set  C η  = 1.2 (implying a moderately 
convex function), and we choose β such that the CO2 tax associated with an emissions reduction 
of 10 percent is $30 per ton.  
4. Quantitative Results 
This section compares the welfare effect of efficiency standards and energy taxes for the 
transport and power sectors and identifies conditions under which efficiency standards are 
warranted. The marginal costs of reducing economywide CO2 emissions under all policies are 
also compared. 
A. Welfare Comparison of Efficiency Standards and Energy Taxes 
(i) Reducing Gasoline 
Figure 1 shows the marginal cost of reducing gasoline under fuel taxes and efficiency 
standards with either no misperceptions failures (panel (a)) or our bounding case for the 
magnitude of misperceptions failures (panel (b)). These estimates incorporate preexisting fuel 
taxes but assume that under higher fuel taxes, efficiency standards are not binding. We note the 
following points. 
First, the marginal cost curves under the standards are more than twice as steep as those 
under the gasoline tax. This is because the fuel standard puts the entire burden of fuel reductions 
on improvements in fuel economy, whereas the gasoline tax also exploits fuel savings from 
reduced vehicle miles traveled.  
Second, with no misperceptions failures, the intercept of the marginal cost under the 
standard is well above that for the tax. For both policies, the preexisting gasoline tax contributes 
40 cents/gallon to the intercept, though this is partly offset by CO2 externality benefits of 18 
cents per gallon in the benchmark case.  
Under the gasoline tax there is an additional welfare gain of $1.04/gallon due to the 
reduction in congestion and other mileage-related externalities. Overall, the marginal cost curve 
under the gasoline tax in panel (a) has a negative intercept of 81 cents/gallon. The marginal cost 
is negative up to a fuel reduction of 11 percent, corresponding to the fuel reduction under the 
optimal gasoline tax, which is $1.26/gallon. Implementing this optimal tax would yield annual 
welfare gains of $5.8 billion. In contrast, mileage increases moderately under the fuel economy 
standard, and the resulting increase in congestion and other externalities further shifts up the 
marginal cost, so it has an overall intercept of 43 cents/gallon. In fact, in this scenario the Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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standard would impose potentially large (total) welfare losses—for example, $5.9 billion a year 
for a 5 percent fuel reduction.  
The third main point is that even with our bounding case for misperceptions failures, the 
marginal cost under the standard does not fall below that for the tax. Again, a fuel tax–efficiency 
standard combination is inferior to the fuel tax alone. This result is independent of climate and 
oil security externalities because they affect the intercept of both marginal cost curves by the 
same amount. 
The marginal cost under the gasoline tax is shifted down substantially further: now the 
intercept is –$1.64 per gallon, the optimal fuel tax rises to $3.08/gallon, and the fuel reduction 
under the optimized tax is 25 percent. The downward shift in the marginal cost curve is much 
larger under the standard because all, rather than a fraction, of the reduction in fuel use comes 
from improved fuel economy. However, even under this bounding case, the intercept of the 
marginal cost under the efficiency standard does not (quite) fall below that for the tax.  
If there are constraints on fuel taxes, fuel economy standards can still be warranted, but 
only with big misperceptions market failures. In our bounding case for these failures, a standard 
that cut fuel use by 8.9 percent would be optimal, though potential welfare gains are only about a 
third of those for the fuel tax.  
(ii) Reducing Electricity 
Figure 2 shows the marginal cost of reducing electricity under taxes and efficiency 
standards, again with no misperceptions failure (panel (a)) and our bounding case for the 
magnitude of the misperceptions failure (panel (b)). We note the following points. 
First, the marginal cost curve under the standard is much steeper than that under the 
electricity tax. This again reflects the failure of the standard to exploit reductions in product 
usage. However in addition, unlike the electricity tax, the standard fails to exploit any electricity 
savings in the unregulated sector (which accounts for 40 percent of use). 
Second, with no misperceptions failures, the electricity tax is welfare improving up to a 
reduction in electricity use of 5.5 percent. Implementing the optimal tax increase (1.4 cents per 
kWh) would generate modest welfare gains of $1.6 billion. Potential welfare gains under the 
efficiency standard are positive (unlike the corresponding case for autos) but very modest, at 
$0.3 billion (the optimized standard would reduce overall electricity use by just 1.3 percent).  
For these policies, local pollution benefits are approximately cancelled out by prior 
(state-level) electricity taxes. Both curves have negative intercepts of –1.3 cents/kWh, reflecting 
the carbon externality. Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
  20
Third, accounting for the misperceptions failure, efficiency standards can be superior to 
electricity taxes, but only for modest reductions in electricity use, of 3 percent or less. The 
marginal cost in Figure 2(b) under the standard has a lower intercept (–8.4 cents/kWh) compared 
with the electricity tax (–5.2 cents/kWh). However, because of its much steeper slope, marginal 
costs under the standard quickly rise above those under the tax. If standards alone were 
optimized, total electricity use would be reduced by 5.5 percent (electricity use in the regulated 
sector would fall by 9.2 percent), but if the tax alone were optimized, electricity would be 
reduced by 24 percent. In principle, for any given reduction in electricity use, it would be 
optimal to supplement the electricity tax with an efficiency standard to skew reductions toward 
efficiency improvements (away from reductions in product use). But even in this upper-bound 
case for misperceptions, in general the potential welfare gains from this combination policy are 
only moderately larger than those from the electricity tax. For example, cutting electricity use by 
10 percent under the tax yields welfare gains of $19.8 billion, while achieving the same 
reduction under the combination yields welfare gains of $21.1 billion.  
B. Market Failures Required to Justify Different Levels of Efficiency Standards 
Figure 3 summarizes, in a different way, the results so far for the efficiency standards. It 
shows “iso-market failure” curves—that is, combinations of CO2 damages and misperceptions 
failures under which it is optimal to reduce fuel or electricity use by different amounts, given 
current energy taxes. 
For automobiles, there is still a high threshold for standards to improve welfare, even if 
current fuel taxes are fixed. For example, if there is no misperceptions market failure, even if 
CO2 damages were $100 per ton, cutting fuel use by 2.5 percent under standards is not 
warranted. Alternatively, reducing gasoline use by 5 percent or more by raising fuel economy 
standards is efficient only if consumers fail to internalize at least 44 percent of the value of fuel 
savings (under our benchmark value for CO2 damages). The recent tightening of CAFE standards 
actually represents a far more aggressive policy than this: new passenger vehicle fuel economy is 
set to rise from 25 mpg to about 35 mpg by 2016, implying a long-run gasoline reduction of 
about 25 percent (after allowing for the rebound effect). Most likely, there would be some 
improvement without regulation as new fuel-saving technologies are incorporated and fuel prices 
rise. Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that it is difficult to justify such a rapid ramp-up in the 
CAFE standards on welfare grounds (i.e., the iso-market failure cost curve for this scale of fuel 
reduction is outside our upper-bound cases for market failures). 
For the power sector, there is a lower threshold for efficiency standards to be optimal, but 
only for small (2.5 percent) reductions in energy use. For more substantial reductions, efficiency Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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standards for the power sector are even more difficult to justify, on market failure grounds, than 
for automobiles. In Figure 3, this is indicated by the higher position of the iso-market failure 
curve in panel b for the 5 percent electricity reduction compared with the corresponding curve in 
panel a, in part because only 60 percent of consumption is subject to these standards. And a 7.5 
percent reduction in electricity use under standards is warranted only under the most extreme of 
our scenarios for market failures.  
C. Role of Efficiency Standards in CO2 Mitigation 
Figure 4 shows marginal cost curves for reducing economywide CO2 emissions under 
alternative policies, where again panels a and b correspond to our two bounding cases for 
misperceptions failures. In contrast to Figures 1 and 2, we do not net out CO2 externality benefits 
from these costs. Again, these figures underscore our previous point that efficiency standards, 
and regulatory approaches more generally, are poor substitutes for pricing policies.  
With no misperceptions failures, the costs of either efficiency standard are huge, relative 
to those of the CO2 tax, for nonmarginal emissions reductions. An emissions standard for the 
power sector is dramatically more effective and cost-effective than efficiency standards. But 
even this regulatory policy does not perform that well relative to the CO2 tax. For example, for a 
CO2 reduction of 10 percent (which, roughly speaking, was projected for 2020 under recent 
federal cap-and-trade proposals), this policy costs $12.9 billion. In contrast, the CO2 tax costs 
only $2.3 billion for the same emissions reduction, given that it exploits more margins for 
abatement and it reduces driving-related externalities. In fact, to target these broader 
externalities, an optimal policy in this case would combine a fuel tax increase with a CO2 tax.  
With (our bounding case for) misperceptions failures, marginal costs under both 
efficiency standards and the gasoline and electricity taxes lie below marginal costs under the CO2 
emissions tax for some range of reductions. However, for both the efficiency standards, marginal 
costs rise rapidly, becoming positive at economywide emissions reductions of 2 percent or less. 
In contrast, marginal costs under the electricity tax and CO2 tax are negative up to emissions 
reductions of about 8 and 15 percent, respectively. In fact, for the 10 percent reduction in CO2, 
total costs under the CO2 tax are now negative, –$10.8 billion. Even the least-cost regulatory 
approach involving both efficiency standards and the emissions standard has costs of plus $3.8 
billion (costs for this combination are not shown in Figure 4), or $14.6 billion more than the CO2 
tax.  Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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5. Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that efficiency standards applied to the transport and power sectors 
are difficult to justify, certainly as a complement to pricing instruments, and even if pricing 
instruments are infeasible for the time being. Although there is much dispute about the 
magnitude of possible market failures associated with misperceptions over energy efficiency 
benefits, even under upper-bound assumptions for these market failures, only modest reductions 
in energy use or emissions are warranted under standards, and potential welfare gains are a minor 
or tiny fraction of those under pricing policies.  
Of course, our analytical framework provides only a first-level assessment of welfare 
effects. Digging deeper, we see a number of caveats.  
  For example, our model assumes “smart” regulation that (implicitly) equates marginal 
compliance costs across producers within a sector. Moving forward, this may be a reasonable 
approximation for automobiles, given the recent extension of credit-trading provisions in the 
CAFE program. It is more questionable for the power sector, given the practical complexities of 
monitoring credit trading among heterogeneous producer groups (e.g., real estate developers and 
refrigerator manufacturers). At any rate, allowing the possibility of imperfect regulation would 
only strengthen our main findings. 
The same would apply to incorporating dynamics into our analysis. Distinguishing capital 
of different vintages would allow us to explore transitory inefficiencies from new product 
standards resulting from the uneven treatment of new and preexisting capital (though it would 
add considerable analytical complexity).  
We assume marginal-cost pricing. In practice, prices deviate from marginal costs because 
of cost-of-service regulation of power generation in many states and limited use of time-of-day 
pricing. However, it is difficult to make general statements about the economywide implications 
of these deviations (even with regard to their sign, let alone their magnitude), given that they are 
highly specific to region and time of day. 
Finally, our welfare analysis is incomplete in that it excludes interactions between energy 
and environmental policies and the distortions in the economy created by the broader fiscal 
system, particularly distortions in factor markets. Literature on this issue suggests that the tax 
revenue or allowance rent created by corrective taxes or cap-and-trade systems is potentially 
problematic (e.g., Goulder et al. 1999). This revenue or rent needs to be used in ways to increase 
economic efficiency, particularly by cutting other distortionary taxes, to offset efficiency losses 
in factor markets caused by higher energy prices and the consequently higher general price level 
and lower real factor returns. Standards, in contrast, have an advantage in this regard: they have a Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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weaker effect on the general price level (i.e., they do not involve the pass-through of tax 
revenues or allowance rents).  
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Appendix A. Analytical Derivations  
Household first-order conditions 
Households solve a two-step optimization procedure using equations (1), (2), and (4). First, they 
choose the quantity of durable goods Si, energy consumption rates ei, planned use of durables mi, and 
planned consumption of I and Y, to maximize utility as follows: 
(A1) = ϕ
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where λ is the marginal utility of income and φ(.) is the (perceived) indirect utility function. The budget 
constraint here equates disposable income, which includes fixed private income of INC, with purchases of 
durable goods, expected lifetime energy spending, and planned consumption of other goods. In the second 
stage, during the course of the period, agents may reoptimize over product usage (and by implication, 
consumption of Y) if energy costs differ from initial perceptions.  
This optimization yields 
(A2a) i i i S L p u
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(A2d) Y Y p u = λ / , I I p u = λ /  
If, through regulation, the energy intensity for product i is reduced below the level that would be 
implied by equation (A2c), then this condition becomes 
(A2e) λ μ ρ δ μ / / ) 1 (
~
i i i i G i i u e L k ′ − ∂ ∂ ⋅ − = − ′ −  
where  G δ
~
 is the shadow value of the constraint, expressed per unit of gasoline intensity. The 
interpretation for equations (A2a–A2e) is provided in the main text. Note that the use of energy durables 
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in (A2b) may differ from planned use, if agents misperceive future energy prices. This discrepancy is 
taken into account in our choice of values for ρi. 
Demand functions and equation (6)  
From the household’s first-order conditions and budget constraint, we obtain demand functions 
for products, product usage, and energy efficiency. All demands can be expressed as functions of energy 
prices. Even though product demands in (A2a) depend on product prices, these depend on energy 
efficiency, which in turn is a function of energy prices. Demand functions are assumed to have constant 
elasticities with respect to their own prices. And as discussed in the text, we approximate by assuming 
that demands for the three energy durables are taken as being decoupled, and so, for example, higher 
gasoline prices do not have a (significant) effect on the demand for electricity durables like household 
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In these equations, superscript 0 denotes an initial value, and parameters 
A S
G η  and so on are 
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E η + , i ≠ A is the 
demand elasticity for electricity used by durable good i, and 
E Ei
i
E E i / ∑ = η η
 is the demand elasticity 
for total electricity use. 
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and so on. 
From differentiating equation (3b) with respect to gasoline and electricity prices, and using (B1) 
and (B3), we can obtain the decomposition of elasticities in (6). 
Equation (7a): Marginal welfare effect of gasoline tax 
The actual (as opposed to perceived) indirect utility is defined by the household’s utility 
maximization problem with future costs correctly measured (deviations from this optimization, due to 
consumer misperceptions, will therefore reduce actual utility). Totally differentiating (A1) with respect to 
tG, with  1 = i ρ  and electricity and industrial variables constant (because they are assumed independent of 
transportation prices) gives, after substituting for gasoline and lifetime gasoline costs, and using (4a) to 
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Note that  0 / = G A dt de  if the fuel economy standard is binding. 
Substituting the household’s first-order conditions (A2) into (C1), the second and fourth terms 
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Dividing (C1) by  G dt dG / −  to express the utility effect per gallon reduction in gasoline, and by 
λ to express utility in monetary units, and substituting (C2)-(C6), along with (7c), gives the welfare 
decomposition in equation (7a).  
Deriving equation (7b): Relation between tax rate and gasoline reduction 
This is easily obtained from the gasoline demand function in (B2a). First invert, and then 
substitute for 
0 /G G  using 
0 / 1 ˆ G G G − = Δ . 
Deriving equation (8a): Marginal welfare effect of fuel economy standard 
Setting  G G e e =  (i.e., the fuel economy standard is binding) and totally differentiating (A1) with 
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Following the derivation of (C2) above, using (A2e) instead of (A2d), the first three terms 
amount to 
(D2) A A G G A S m t q ) ( + −λρ G δ
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G t  is the preexisting gasoline tax. Substituting (D2)-(D6) into (D1), and using the definition of 
external costs in (7c), we obtain (8a), where  ) / /(
~ 0
G G G G e d dG t δ δ + = .  
Deriving equation (8b): relation shadow price and fuel reduction 
G δ  can be viewed as a virtual tax that reduces gasoline use by improving fuel economy, adjusted 
for the offsetting fuel increase from the rebound effect. That is, the relevant elasticity for this shadow 
price is  ) 1 ( A
e
G r
A − η  rather than  G η  for an increase in the gasoline tax (affecting all margins for fuel 
reduction opportunities). Thus, under the fuel economy standard, the gasoline demand function in (B2a) 


























0 / 1 ˆ G G G − = Δ  gives (8b). 
Deriving equation (9a): Marginal welfare effect of electricity tax  
Following the analogous derivation to derivations (C1)-(C6), but this time for raising the 
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Dividing (F1) by  ∑ −
i
E i dt dE /  to express the utility effect per unit reduction in electricity, and 
by λ to express utility in monetary units, and substituting (F2)-(F6), along with (9c), gives the welfare 
decomposition in equation (9a).  
Deriving equation (9b): Relation between tax rate and electricity reduction 
Again, this is easily obtained from the electricity demand function in (B2b) after inverting and 
substituting 
0 / E E  with 
0 / 1 ˆ E E E − = Δ . 
Deriving the marginal welfare effect of efficiency standard for the power sector  
Following the analogous derivation to derivations (D1)-(D6), but this time for the efficiency 
standard (and ignoring cross-price effects among energy durables), we obtain 
(G1) =
R e d
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Substituting (G2)-(G6) into (G1), we obtain  
(G7) − − − =
E
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Deriving equation (11a): Marginal welfare effect of a CO2 tax 




























































The first component is the gasoline tax equivalent of the increase in the CO2 tax. That is, the CO2 
tax effectively raises the gasoline tax per gallon by 
G
C C G z dt dt = / . And an incremental increase in the 
gasoline tax has a welfare cost per gallon of  ) / /( ) / ) / (( G G
t
G dt dG t MC
G λ ϕ ∂ ∂ = . Making these 
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= α  
This expression is the share of the reduction in economywide CO2 reductions that comes from 
reduced gasoline use. 
The second component in (H1) is the electricity tax equivalent of the increase in the CO2 tax. 
That is, the CO2 tax has the equivalent effect on electricity output as an increase in the electricity tax of 
E
C C E z dt dt = / . And an incremental increase in the electricity tax has a welfare cost per kWh of Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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) / /( ) / ) / (( E E
t
E dt dE t MC
E λ ϕ ∂ ∂ = . Making these substitutions in (H1), and using (10), gives the second 
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This expression is the share of the reduction in economywide CO2 reductions that comes from 
reduced electricity use. 
The third component in (H1) is the equivalent effect of the CO2 tax in terms of reducing 
emissions per unit of electricity, holding electricity output constant. From (4d) the added abatement cost 
per unit reduction in the emissions rate is  C E t k = ′ , though there is a gain from reducing local pollution of 
EXTE per unit reduction in emissions. Thus, the welfare cost per unit of emissions reduction is the third 
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Finally, aside from CO2, there are no market failures associated with production and use of the 
industrial good, and therefore the welfare cost per unit of emissions reduction from this sector is simply 
tC. (This can be verified by differentiating the utility function with respect to the tax-induced increase in 
the unit price of this good, 
I
C z , taking account of the increase in government transfers  ) / ( C
I
C dt dI I z + ). 
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Appendix B. Additional Documentation for Parameters 
CO2 Damages 
Some studies (e.g., Nordhaus 2008) value CO2 damages at about $10/ton, while others value it at 
about $80/ton (e.g., Stern 2007). One reason for the different estimates is that because of long 
atmospheric residence times and the gradual adjustment of the climate system, today’s emissions have 
very long range consequences, and their discounted damages are therefore highly sensitive to assumed 
discount rates. Some analysts (e.g., Heal 2009) argue against discounting the utility of future generations 
on ethical grounds, to avoid discriminating against people just because they are born in the future; others Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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(e.g., Nordhaus 2007) view market discounting as essential for meaningful policy analysis and to avoid 
perverse policy implications in other contexts. 
The second reason for different CO2 damage assessments has to do with the treatment of extreme 
catastrophic risks, such as the possibility that an unstable feedback mechanism in the climate system 
might lead to a truly catastrophic warming. In particular, it is possible that the marginal damages from 
CO2 emissions are arbitrarily large if the probability distribution over future climate damages has “fat 
tails”—that is, the probability of increasingly catastrophic outcomes falls more slowly than marginal 
utility rises (with diminished consumption) in those outcomes (Weitzman 2009). Others (e.g., Nordhaus 
2009) have critiqued the fat-tails hypothesis on the grounds that we can head off a future catastrophic 
outcome by radical mitigation measures, and possibly geoengineering, in response to future learning 
about the seriousness of climate change.  
A recent Inter-Agency Working Group (U.S. IAWG 2010) recommended using a value of $21.4 
per ton of CO2 for 2010, with additional values of $4.70, $35.10, and $64.90 per ton for sensitivity 
analysis. We begin with a benchmark value of $20 per ton and use a range of $10 to $100 for sensitivity 
analysis.  
Local pollution from electricity generation 
In our analysis, local pollutants consist of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, fine particulate matter 
(with a diameter less than 2.5 micrograms), and coarse particulate matter (with a diameter between 2.5 
and 10 micrograms) from natural gas and coal combustion. We use the generation-weighted national 
estimates of damages per kWh reported in a study by the National Research Council (NRC 2009). We 
then weight these per kWh damages by the share of total 2007 production as reported in EIA (2009), 
assuming that other methods of generation are not a significant source of local air pollutants (oil-fired and 
waste-fired generation are less than 2.1 percent of total generation). Our estimate of the average local 
pollution damage is 1.7 cents per kWh. However, baseload coal-fired generation accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of these damages, but the marginal fuel (typically natural gas) accounts for 
a disproportionately large share of reductions in electricity use. To make some adjustment for this, we 
assume a local pollution benefit from electricity reductions of 1.3 cents per kWh.  Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
  36
Energy efficiency misperceptions 
There is evidence, from studies examining consumer purchases of a wide range of domestic 
appliances and other energy-related investments, that consumers have very high implicit discount rates for 
energy efficiency.14 However, whether these high implicit discount rates reflect market failures or hidden 
costs is very unsettled.  
Market failure explanations may reflect the basic problem of the costly acquisition and processing 
of information. Many consumers may not know what the relevant cost savings are. Furthermore, 
consumers may believe that the prospective cost savings are exaggerated.15 On the other hand, high 
implicit discount rates may instead reflect hidden costs, like reductions in other product attributes as a 
result of higher energy efficiency. Moreover, rational consumers may hold back on what may be largely 
“irreversible investments” with uncertain returns (Hassett and Metcalf 1993) because of risk aversion or 
liquidity constraints.  
If high implicit discount rates reflect real information problems, consumers are largely unaware 
of the potential costs savings from energy-efficient technologies, and this corresponds to a positive value 
for ρi. In contrast, if these high rates reflect hidden or other costs, this corresponds to a positive value for 
i i u μ μ ′ , which does not enter the welfare formulas because it is an internalized cost. We therefore 
consider two bounding cases meant to span the range of possibilities: one where the difference between 
implicit and social discount rates reflects a misperceptions market failure (i.e., ρi > 0) and another where it 
is explained entirely by hidden costs (i.e., ρi = 0). 
For electricity durables, we use a bounding case of ρi (i = R, N) = 0.62. This is equivalent to 
discounting electricity savings at 25 percent, compared with a social discount rate of 5 percent, for a 
product with a 20-year life, where excessive discounting is due entirely to market failures. 
                                                 
14 Hausman (1979), examining household purchases of room air-conditioners, found implicit discount rates of 
around 20 percent. Later studies found comparable, and in some instances, much higher rates. Dubin and McFadden 
(1984), for example, in a study of space-heating and water-heating investments, also found implicit discount rates of 
around 20 percent, but Gately (1980) found much higher discount rates, 45 to 300 percent, in his study of consumer 
purchases of refrigerators. Likewise, Ruderman et al. (1987) calculated implicit discount rates ranging all the way 
from 20 to 800 percent on residential purchases of heating and cooling equipment and appliances. Little (1984) and 
Berkovec et al. (1983) report implicit discount rates of 32 percent for thermal shell investments and 25 percent for 
space-heating systems. 
15 For example, Hassett and Metcalf (1995) found, after accounting for all the costs, that the realized return to attic 
insulation (9.7 percent) was well below that promised by engineers and manufacturers.  Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
  37
For automobiles, empirical literature on implicit discount rates is more mixed.16 We follow one 
scenario explored by NRC (2002) in which consumers value fuel economy improvements by considering 
(undiscounted) fuel savings over the first three years of a vehicle life. Using NRC’s assumptions for 
vehicle life and declining vehicle usage with age, with a social discount rate of 5 percent, this implies ρA = 
0.65 if there are no hidden costs.  
 
                                                 
16 One study, by Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995), finds a discount rate of 11 to 17 percent, though the average new car 
loan interest rate was 12.6 percent in their sample, suggesting that car buyers may have been constrained by liquidity 
rather than myopic. Another study, by Allcott and Wozny (2009), however, suggest consumers may consider fuel 
savings from efficiency improvements over only three years. This finding is consistent with EIA’s National Energy 
Modeling System, in which new auto buyers are assumed to use payback periods of three years. On the other hand, 
Sallee and West (2010) estimate implicit discount rates close to market rates, based on a study of the used-auto 
market. For more discussion of the literature, see Greene (2010). Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
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Energy intensity, gal./1000 miles or kWh/hour 43.5 0.73 0.48
Initial energy tax, $/gal., $/kWh 0.4 0.009 0.009
Initial pre‐tax energy price, $/gal., $/kWh 2.15 0.082 0.082
Initial quantity of fuel/energy, bn gallons,  billion kWh 130 2,506 1,670
Price elasticities (standards non‐binding)
elasticity with repsect to own price of energy ‐0.40 ‐0.40 ‐0.40
fraction of elasticity from:
reduced usage per p r o d u c t 0 . 2 50 . 3 30 . 3 3
reduced demand for p r o d u c t 0 . 2 50 . 1 70 . 1 7
reduced energy intensity per unit of u s e 0 . 5 00 . 5 10 . 5 1
External costs
CO2 intensity, tons/gal., tons/kWh 0.009 0.0005 0.0005
CO2 damages, $/gal., $/kWh 0.18 0.01 0.01
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Figure 3. Market Failures Required to Justify Efficiency Standards of Different Stringencies 
 















































































opt. elec. reduction 7.5%Resources for the Future  Parry, Evans, and Oates 
  42
Figure 4. Marginal Cost of Policies to Reduce CO2 Emissions 
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